The tension between authority and accountability is central to corporate law. This tension stems from the fact that control of the corporation is vested in a board of directors, and board members take actions on behalf of those who have traditionally been considered the "owners" of the corporation, the shareholders. 
The 1985 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom 23 caused considerable unrest among members of corporate boards and their legal advisors.
24
In Van Gorkom, board members were held personally liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties, despite the absence of a conflict of interest.
25 Many observers were taken aback by this result, and a public outcry followed. 26 The consequences of this decision, particularly the perceived crisis in securing directors" and officers" liability insurance, spurred some state legislatures into action.
27 By 1986, Delaware enacted a statute enabling a corporation to limit or eliminate the personal liability of directors for breaches of the duty of care.
28 All fifty states have implemented some version of 23 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) . 24 See sources cited infra note 26. Van Gorkom has "contributed to the anxiety pervading many corporate board rooms"). 27 See sources cited infra notes 28-29. 28 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007); Honabach, supra note 11, at 307 ("Reacting to the alarms set off by [Smith v. Van Gorkom] , the Delaware legislature quickly enacted section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Section 102(b)(7) permits shareholders to adopt a charter provision granting directors immunity from personal liability for breaches of their duty of care.").
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Delaware"s approach, and virtually all of the nation"s largest corporations include these exculpatory provisions in their charters.
29
This Article argues that the time has come to re-examine these statutes and improve the status quo. Part I describes the Smith v. Van Gorkom holding and the subsequent decision by the Delaware legislature to allow corporations to remove the prospect of personal liability for directors for duty of care breaches by adopting an exculpatory charter provision. Part II argues that the exculpatory statutes in their current form are harmful to shareholders and the orderly function of corporate law. First, this Part demonstrates that the existence and current use of the statute incentivizes board members to engage in sub-optimal behavior. Second, Part II questions the legitimacy of the original need for enacting the statute. Third, this Part claims that another area of corporate law, judicial interpretation of the duty of good faith, is being manipulated to circumvent the restrictions placed on courts by corporations that choose to eliminate liability for breaching the duty of care. Part III introduces the contractarian theory supporting of the current statute, examines the limitations of that theory, and explores the implications of the theory in determining the proper course of action. Finally, Part IV recommends actions available to dissatisfied shareholders, including a specific improvement in the mechanics of the statute-the addition of a requirement that shareholders must re-approve an exculpatory charter provision at least every five years.
I. THE VAN GORKOM DECISION AND THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 102(b)(7) IN DELAWARE
Because of the important role that fiduciary duties play in holding directors accountable, the impetus to remove this protection needed to be significant. This motivation came from the confluence of a number of events, the most immediate of which was the 1985 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom. (revealing that in a sample "of one hundred "Fortune 500" companies, ninety-eight of the stock corporations that incorporated in jurisdictions allowing for exculpatory charter provisions have adopted such provisions" and in "a sample of one hundred small-and midcapitalization companies, all but one (a Delaware corporation) of those incorporated in a jurisdiction authorizing exculpatory charter provisions have included such a provision in their articles or certificate of incorporation"); Honabach, supra note 11, at 307, 313 (claiming that following the enactment of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, "all but one jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, enacted some kind of mandatory or optional provision permitting shareholders of corporations incorporated in their jurisdiction to provide similar protection to their directors" and "virtually every publicly traded corporation incorporated in Delaware adopted a section 102(b)7 provision").
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Corporate attorneys had long believed that, even though both a duty of care and loyalty were owed to shareholders, the business judgment rule effectively precluded the imposition of personal liability on directors for a breach of the duty of care.
31 In fact, a venerable statement of the law on this matter claimed that "[t]he search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."
32 Absent a conflict, the standard advice was that directors need not worry about personal liability. 33 Van Gorkom changed that advice. Following Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law allowing the elimination of personal liability for directors who breach their duty of care.
34 This Part describes the Van Gorkom decision and traces the origins of the enactment of section 102(b)(7).
A. Smith v. Van Gorkom
Van Gorkom involved the sale of Trans Union Corporation. 35 Jerome Van Gorkom was the Chief Executive Officer and a significant stockholder of Trans Union.
36 Van Gorkom discussed selling the company with some of his fellow executives, but only in a preliminary manner. 37 As part of these discussions, officers of the company provided him with some basic financial data analyzing how easily a buyout could be financed.
38 Using this information, Van Gorkom approached Jay 106   TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW  [VOL. 9 Pritzker about buying the company. 39 Pritzker offered to purchase Trans Union and gave Van Gorkom a short timeframe during which to respond to his proposal. 40 Van Gorkom called a meeting of the Trans Union board to discuss the acquisition proposal. 41 The meeting was called on only two days notice, and no indication of its purpose was given in advance. 42 Although Van Gorkom gave an oral presentation at the meeting, he did not provide financial analyses or any written documentation and did not disclose the source of his figures or the full extent of the negotiation process by which Pritzker became interested in purchasing Trans Union. 43 The board asked very few follow-up questions before approving the merger. 44 Van Gorkom then executed the Merger Agreement with substantial amendments on behalf of Trans Union without seeking further board approval. 45 Delaware"s Supreme Court found that the board"s actions violated the duty of care and that the board acted in a grossly negligent manner in deciding to accept Pritzker"s offer. 46 The court based its conclusion on the finding that the board did not act on an informed basis when making its decision to proceed with the acquisition.
47
Prior to the Van Gorkom holding, courts did not find directors 39 Id. at 866. 40 Id. 867. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. at 868. 44 Id. at 869. 45 Id. 
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WHAT "S THE COST OF A FREE PASS? A CALL FOR THE RE-ASSESSMENT OF 107  STATUTES THAT ALLOW FOR THE ELIMINATION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS   personally liable absent a conflict of interest. 48 However, in Van Gorkom, the court found the directors liable based solely on the breaches of the duty of care.
49
This reliance on the duty of care alone instigated fears and concerns from many quarters. First, commentators were unsure whether Van Gorkom signaled a change in the law that would mean the beginning of intense scrutiny of the substance of all board decisions.
50
The decision also brought about concern that the protections of the business judgment rule would be meaningless if courts were to entertain substantive doubts about the wisdom of board decisions based on the informational component of the duty of care. ) (recognizing that most commentators agree that "the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Trans Union board had been grossly negligent" but rather that "that courts used Trans Union in order to have a voice in corporate governance notwithstanding the supposed constraint of the business judgment rule"). : THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW  [VOL. 9 of the decision, 54 but many did not find fault. Some commentators noted that Van Gorkom placed an increased emphasis on the informational component of decisionmaking but did not alter pre-existing legal standards. 55 Others argued that the import of the holding was limited to the facts of the case. 56 Still other commentators found nothing more than a straightforward application of existing precedent.
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57
The discussion about the import and proper place of Van Gorkom continues today.
58
Regardless of whether the agonizing over Van Gorkom was justified, the directors" and officers" insurance market sought to immediately incorporate the import of the decision into its underwriting practices. 59 Serious concerns over the potential for increased liability arose in the insurance market from those providing 54 See sources cited supra notes 50, 52. 62 But see Honabach, supra note 11, at 324 (asserting that "for reasons only tangentially related to Van Gorkom, D&O insurance rates began to soar"); Lee, supra note 31, at 252-54 (finding that "[although almost all would agree that the general insurance crisis is a problem deeply rooted in our society, less agreement exists regarding the causes of the crisis[,] but acknowledging that "some evidence does exist, however, that a good deal of the insurance industry"s woes were self-inflicted through competitive underpricing and questionable management"). 63 Bradley & Schipani, supra note 52 at 43 (citing legislative history referring to the "concern regarding changes in the market for directors" liability insurance [,] " which "resulted in the unavailability of D&O liability insurance" and the unwillingness of many to serve as directors); Daniel, supra note 57, at 661 (noting significant modifications in some state corporation statutes instituted in response to "the increasing liability of directors and officers" coupled with "the decreasing availability of D&O liability insurance"). 67 The statute expressly prohibits the elimination of liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty, declaration of illegal dividends, acts known to be unlawful or not taken in good faith, and transactions in which a director derives an improper personal benefit.
68
In essence, this statute allows exculpation for breaches of the duty of care, including the type that occurred in Van Gorkom. 69 In fact, the statutory amendment is widely seen as legislatively overturning the decision. 70 Those in favor of the statute pointed to policy justifications for its enactment, similar to those supporting the business judgment rule. 71 Those opposed felt that the legislature abdicated its role in ensuring effective corporate governance.
72
Regardless of their views on the 67 Id.; Honabach, supra note 11, at 312 (stating that section 102(b)(7) allows corporations "to shelter directors from personal liability to the corporation or its shareholders as long as their conduct does not fall within four express exception"). 68 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); Honabach, supra note 11, at 312 (citing the four exceptions as "unlawful dividends; acts or omissions that constitute a breach of the director"s duty of loyalty; acts or omissions not made in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; and any transaction from which the director derives an improper personal benefit"). 69 Honabach, supra note 11, at 312 ("Section 102(b)(7) allows corporations to negate the application of Van Gorkom to their directors even when directors engage in grossly negligent conduct . . . ."). soundness of the amendment, commentators agree that section 102(b)(7) effectively eliminated director liability for a duty of care breach similar to that in Van Gorkom.
73
There are two particularly noteworthy aspects of the mechanics of section 102(b)(7). First, it is placed in the section of the General Corporation Law that lists permissive charter provisions. 74 Thus, section 102(b)(7) is a "charter option" statute, an elective remedy for corporations and not a mandatory rule. 75 The exculpatory provision is not forced on any shareholders, and it must either be part of the charter when a shareholder first invests or the shareholders must affirmatively vote to include it. 76 Second, section 102(b)(7) only eliminates personal liability for directors. 77 Equitable remedies, such as securing an injunction, remain available for a breach of the duty of care. 78 This approach has been very widely adopted, and each (1) charter option provisions which gives the corporation the option of including a provision in the charter that eliminates or limits the personal liability of its directors subject to expressly stated exceptions and (2) self-executing provisions which is a "direct legislative immunization of directors . . . from liability, without the necessity of a charter provision, but with certain exceptions"). 76 Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 75, at 24 (stating that the charter option authorizes a corporation to include a provision either eliminating or limiting director liability in its charter either when it is "originally adopted or by amendment (thus requiring a shareholder vote)"). of the fifty states has adopted some version of the statute. 79 In addition, virtually every major corporation has included a broad provision eliminating liability in their charters.
80
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS QUO
The current status quo is that directors of most companies have essentially no risk of being held liable for breaching their duty of care.
81
Many favor the statutes, and their arguments mimic those in favor of the business judgment rule. First, courts are poorly situated and trained to make determinations about the propriety of business decisions. Second, looking at spur of the moment decisions with the benefit of hindsight unfairly prejudices courts against those decisions that turn out poorly despite having been initially made properly. Directors who know that a risky decision that later turns out poorly could cost them their entire personal net worth may be unduly cautious in their choices.
82
Whatever its benefits, the status quo promotes unsatisfactory results in at least three ways. First, the statute gives directors incentives to be negligent in handling the affairs of the corporation. 83 Second, later evidence has called into question the original need for the statute. 84 Third, because of the unavailability of the duty of care in most cases, courts are expanding the notion of the duty of good faith to encompass breaches that appear to be facially indistinguishable from violations of the duty of care. 85 Veasey, Finkelstein, & Bigler, supra note 61, at 403 ("The duty of care continues to have vitality in remedial contexts as opposed to actions for personal monetary damages against directors as individuals."). 79 See text accompanying supra, notes 29, 64. 80 
Id.
81 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 82 Herzel & Katz, supra note 50, at 1189 (stating that "[t]he threat of crushing legal liability will make [directors] too cautious"). 83 See infra Part II.A. 84 See infra Part II.B. 85 See infra Part II.C.
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A. Section 102(b)(7) Provides Directors Incentives to Be Negligent
The first problem with the current statutory structure is that it incentivizes directors toward sub-optimal behavior. The statute does this in both an obvious and a subtle way. Obviously, if a corporation enacts a charter amendment, as allowed in section 102(b)(7), there is virtually no chance that a director will sustain any personal financial penalty for a duty of care breach. 86 Without this fear of personal sanction, the deterrent effect of a duty of care violation is taken away. In general, negative consequences provide an incentive to avoid certain types of behavior. The threat of sanction for acting in a grossly negligent manner serves this purpose. Second, a subtler, more insidious way that the law incentivizes directors to be careless is seen with the interplay between state corporate law and federal securities laws, particularly private rights of action under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Rule 10b-5 actions require scienter and impose liability only when the defendant acts knowingly and with intent to deceive. 87 Thus, this standard imposes liability on active, engaged board members who uncover material misstatements or omissions but do not act emphatically enough to prevent them. However, a lax or unengaged board member does not act with scienter and, therefore, will not incur the same liability under Rule 10b-5.
The Importance of Personal Liability
Many commentators have stressed the importance of the deterrent effect of liability rules in general, and especially in the duty of care context. 88 In Delaware"s Good Faith, Professor Hillary Sale attributes the potential for liability as central in creating a norm of good corporate governance and an incentive for boards to avoid penalty. 89 She further suggests that adherence to the norm of due care makes 86 Dunn, supra note 22, at 544 n.65 (quoting In re Caremark Int"l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (stating that a duty of care claim "is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment"). 87 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that action under Rule 10b-5 requires scienter and describing scienter as an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"). 88 Lee, supra note 31, at 264, 267 (defining the duty of care today as "an obligation to "show up" and inform oneself, and not much else [,] " yet concluding that the "duty of care has always served, and will continue to serve, an important deterrent function broadly as an "aspirational statement" and narrowly as a remedial tool when other marketbased deterrents have failed."). 89 Sale, supra note 72, at 466 (finding a roadmap in Van Gorkom for duty of care enforcement: "imposition of substantial personal liability on the fiduciaries involved in the challenged decision . . . creat [es] an incentive for other fiduciaries to avoid such penalties and adhere to the norms of good corporate governance" 90 The idea is that the procedural good of informing oneself is not simply an intrinsic good, but is instrumental in achieving other desirable ends such as being aware of conflicts and making substantive decisions that are more likely to be of the greatest benefit to shareholders. In a similar vein, Professor Lynn Stout argues that the requirement to become informed may be critical in promoting the behavior that is most beneficial to the firm and its shareholders by reducing the marginal personal sacrifice that a director must make to act in such a careful manner. 91 In addition, Mae Kuykendall points to exculpation statutes as causing a separation of the substantive law of corporations and the remedies available to redress violations of those substantive provisions. 92 Each of these commentators, in a similar yet distinct way, argues for the importance of a robust duty of care, bolstered by the potential for sanction.
However, other commentators have argued that either other checks on director behavior adequately contain this externality or that the inclusion of the charter amendment does little to alter the current landscape. 93 The checks most frequently cited as compensating for the lack of personal liability are market forces and reputational concerns. 94 Market forces impact director behavior in two different ways. First, shareholders are less likely to re-elect directors who do not help the corporation become more valuable. 95 This linkage provides directors with an 90 Id. at 465 ("Directors and officers who comply with the duty of due care are less likely to violate other duties. They are more likely to weigh decisions, consult with appropriate advisors, and disclose conflicts of interest."). 91 93 See infra text accompanying notes 94-96. 94 Elson & Thompson, supra note 9, at 581 (identifying the markets, contracts and other private ordering, the law, and norms as other constraints on director behavior); Fairfax, supra, note 13, at 428-29, 432 (recognizing that the threat of harm to a directors" reputation should ensure they fulfill their fiduciary duties but concluding that this threat is not sufficient to ensure appropriate behavior in practice). 95 But see infra Part IV.B (discussing the general ineffectiveness of shareholder voting as a check on directorial power).
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incentive to increase stock price and shareholder wealth. 96 Second, directors are compensated for their service, oftentimes at least partially in the stock of the corporation. Both the fact of compensation and the particular form of stock payment provide incentive for directors to continue in their current board positions and to perform admirably to attract the prospect of other memberships.
There are also significant reputational constraints on board members. 97 Service on a major corporate board is an exclusive club, one that many in corporate America would like to join, and one in which current members would like to remain. Reputational constraints are often cited as a theoretical ideal of a mechanism to regulate directorial behavior. 98 However, reality does not often live up to this ideal for a variety of reasons. In promoting her conception of director altruism, Professor Stout recognized that the private nature of a director"s work makes it difficult to produce a public reckoning for misbehavior. 99 In addition, Professor Lisa Fairfax conducted a review of the wrongdoings at Enron and concluded that "neither the market nor the threat of reputational damages fulfilled their regulatory function for Enron . . . ." 100 Fairfax concluded that the threat of legal sanction may be a necessary signal.
101
Legal sanction identifies the acts that the law wishes to prevent, and 96 Fairfax, supra note 13, at 429-30 (stating that when directors "fail to behave responsibly, thereby engaging in conduct that harms shareholders and their profits, the harm is reflected in lowered stock prices;" however, "the capital market effectively regulates corporate conduct by deterring directors from taking actions (or failing to take actions) that adversely affect their corporations" stock price"). 97 Id. at 429 ("As members of these various communities, directors have strong incentives to perform their duties in a manner that does not damage their reputation within these communities."). 98 Id. at 428 (stating that many scholars insist that the desire of directors "to maintain a positive reputation encourages them to perform their fiduciary responsibilities with the appropriate level of diligence" such that legal sanctions are unnecessary); see also Stout, supra note 91, at 682 (stating that the idea of "social sanctions," including loss of reputation, "has attracted much attention from corporate scholars in recent years"). Directors are concerned with their specific reputation on the board as well as their general reputation in the larger community. Fairfax, supra note 13, at 429. 99 Stout, supra note 91, at 682 (stating that "most of the time, the fear of social sanctions provides only a weak motive for exercising care"). 100 Fairfax, supra note 13, at 430. 101 Id. at 442-43 ("If there are sufficient signals for directors to use to distinguish between improper and proper conduct and if there is some degree of certainty that improper conduct will lead to legal sanctions, then legal sanctions can serve as powerful constrains on directors.").
2007]
WHAT "S THE COST OF A FREE PASS? A CALL FOR THE RE-ASSESSMENT OF 117  STATUTES THAT ALLOW FOR THE ELIMINATION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS identification may be necessary to produce the reputational disincentives that would make the legal constraints effective.
102
Another argument in favor of a statute allowing the removal of personal liability is that the statute accomplishes nothing new or remarkable. Specifically, corporations have previously limited or eliminated this type of liability through other means; therefore, a provision providing for one additional method of accomplishing this goal should not be a concern. The two primary means by which corporations addressed the personal liability of directors before section 102(b)(7) were by providing indemnification and purchasing insurance. 103 Buying an insurance policy and providing indemnification both have the same practical effect as eliminating liability under the statute; they provide an alternative source of funds so that the director will not have to personally pay any judgments in satisfaction of a breach of duty claim. If a corporation can indemnify or insure its board members without noticeable negative effects, 104 why can it not use the charter option as well?
There are meaningful differences between exculpation and indemnification and insurance. First, an indemnification statute has a protective provision built into it forbidding indemnification in derivative actions. 105 Thus, the indemnification statute expressly prohibits directors from receiving protection if the harm is caused to the corporation itself. third-party check on exculpation. By defining the scope of coverage, setting the financial limits of the policy, and determining the premium, the counterparty to the insurance contract has the ability to set forth its conception of good governance and incentivize board members to live up to this conception. No such opportunity exists with section 102(b)(7). Also, a study reported in 1989 by Michael Bradley and Cindy Schipani supports the contention that the mere availability of the exculpation statute did harm shareholders of Delaware corporations. 107 The authors found a significant decrease in the values of Delaware firms after enactment of section 102(b)(7), indicating that Delaware corporations were hurt by the lesser exposure of directors to personal liability. 108 The decrease in value indicated that the market viewed potential personal liability as an effective constraint on directors, 109 and, more generally, that liability rules are important tools in promoting efficient corporate governance. 
The Incentive to Shirk Provided by Rule 10b-5
The scholarship cited above raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of a regime that does not allow for the imposition of personal liability on directors. However, even if market and reputational checks are adequate to constrain the obvious negative incentive provided by the statute, the more subtle reinforcement of these negative impulses remains. Namely, Rule 115 This "strong inference" of fraud "must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent." 116 Thus, for directors who are largely or wholly uninvolved in the management and oversight of the corporation they have been elected to lead, the lack of scienter will leave them free from personal liability for any material corporate misstatements or omissions under Rule 10b-5.
The countervailing legal standard prohibiting the shirking of directorial responsibilities is the state law duty of care.
117
The duty of care mandates that 112 Id. at 193 (holding that action under Rule 10b-5 requires scienter and describing scienter as an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"). 116 Tellabs Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2404-05. 117 In a more limited but critically important set of circumstances, there is another check on directors" behavior, the availability of a due diligence defense for violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Section 11 holds issuers and a number of individuals (including members of the board of directors) strictly liable for any material misstatements or omissions found in a registration statement. Directors can avoid this liability by demonstrating that they have performed a reasonable investigation, and that the reasonable investigation did and should not have discovered the misstatement or omission. The performance of this type of investigation is commonly known as "due diligence." Liability under this section can be massive, and it would be an effective counter-weight to the concern over scienter. However, Section 11 only applies to corporations who file a registration statement containing a material misstatement or omission, a much narrower set of corporations than 120 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 9 directors act in a reasonably prudent manner 118 and specifically requires that they make decisions using "all material information reasonably available to them." 119 The imposition of a duty of care offsets the uneven penalty provided under a scienter standard which holds engaged directors liable but allows those who are uninvolved to escape personal liability. 120 The exculpatory statutes remove this countervailing impulse and further incentivize directors to shirk. This concern that directors may shirk their duties initially sounds fanciful but is not merely hypothetical. The outside acts of directors of both Enron and WorldCom demonstrate the real-world implications of the exculpation of board members from duty of care breaches. In the litigation surrounding both of these matters, outside directors were sued in private rights of action under Rule 10b-5, 121 and the corporations had charter provisions that eliminated personal liability for duty of care breaches.
122 Also, investigations into the events leading up to the collapse of both corporations showed gross inattentiveness and failure of board members to live up to their duty of care. 
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Enron directors admitted to signing off on company reports with limited or no knowledge of their contents and approving transactions they did not understand.
124
These directors were also alerted by Enron"s auditors that their accounting practices were high risk, tended to push limits, and were at the edge of acceptable practice. 125 In addition, the directors waived a conflict of interest and allowed its Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, to act on behalf of special purpose entities who were doing business with Enron.
126 However, the board had no systems in place to monitor those matters, and this lapse directly contributed to the financial fraud that occurred. 127 Similarly, independent investigations showed a lack of attentiveness by the directors at WorldCom. 128 A Special Committee Report illustrated that the audit committee was so disengaged that it virtually had no chance of identifying anything (hereinafter Special Committee Report) (finding that the there was a "significant failure of corporate governance" at WorldCom and that the directors "played far too small a role in the life, direction, and culture of the 
.").
124 Powers Report, supra note 123, at 22-24 (discussing the lack of oversight by the Enron"s Board of Directors and stating that they "can and should be faulted for failing to demand more information, and for failing to probe and understand the information that did come to it"). 125 Black, Cheffins, & Klausner, supra note 123, at 1127 (citing an investigate report of Enron indicating the Audit Committee was informed by the auditors "that the company"s accounting practices were "high risk," tended to "push limits," and were "at the edge" of acceptable practice"). 126 Powers Report, supra note 123, at 8-9 (stating that the directors allowed Mr. Fastow to participate in the LJM partnerships despite the conflict of interest due to him being a manager and investor of the partnerships and the CFO of Enron). 127 Powers Report, supra note 123, at 9-10. 128 Black, Cheffins, & Klausner, supra note 123, at 1121 (citing two investigative reports finding the directs were "exceedingly passive and utterly failed to perform their oversight responsibilities").
TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
other than the most flagrant or obvious financial frauds, 129 and it also showed that the directors missed several "red flags" that should have alerted them to wrongdoing. 130 As a whole, the board approved loans to WorldCom"s Chief Executive Officer, Bernard Ebbers, on terms that no financial institution would have accepted and approved multi-billion dollar transactions without understanding their substance. 131 As part of their defense, WorldCom directors claimed that the securities fraud claims should be dismissed because they lacked scienter. 132 As evidence of this lack of scienter, the directors pointed to the brief meetings, the extreme deference in oversight to the Chief Executive Officer, and the failure to engage in substantive business matters under their purview. 133 Each of these defenses could also be used as an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty under state law. 134 However, because of the exculpatory provision in its charter, WorldCom directors not only escaped liability for breaching their duty of care, but they also attempted to escape federal securities law liability by relying on the fact that they had breached their state law duties. 129 Special Committee Report, supra note 123, at 278 (stating that the directors "played so limited a role in the oversight of WorldCom that it is unlikely that any but the most flagrant and open financial fraud could have come to their attention"). 130 Id. at 30, 282 (stating that the directors "did not function in a way that made it likely that red flags would come to their attention"). The court references four red flags: "(1) questions raised during an earnings conference call on 131 Black, Cheffins, & Klausner, supra note 123, at 1122, 1123 (noting that no financial institution would have assumed the risk associated with the loans and guarantees made to Ebbers and that multibillion dollar transactions were approved "on the basis of virtually no data"). 132 See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 417 ("The five Director Defendants who have been named in a Section 10(b) claim argue principally that the Section 10(b) claim must be dismissed because there are insufficient allegations of their individual scienter."). 133 
B. Section 102(b)(7) Is Not Needed to Satisfy Its Original Purpose
The second problem created or exacerbated by the exculpatory statute is that it either does not remedy the problems it was designed to fix or those problems did not turn out to be actual causes for alarm. This section closely examines three related issues raised by the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom and argues that each provides evidence that the incentives leading to the enactment of section 102(b)(7) were not substantial enough to warrant the particularly drastic response.
The Virtues of Van Gorkom and Corporate Managers as a Special Interest
Several commentators argued that Smith v. Van Gorkom provided valuable guidance regarding how to conduct oneself as a director consistent with his fiduciary duties rather than signal a cause for alarm for corporate directors. 135 These commentators look to the enactment of section 102(b)(7), not as a needed remedy to judicial overreaching, but as an opportunistic move by management looking to provide themselves even more favorable circumstances, regardless of the underlying substance of the matter.
136
In general, these commentators believe that Van Gorkom was simply an application of current Delaware law to the proposed Trans Union transaction and was only novel to the extent that it applied to the facts of the case.
137
One 135 Daniel, supra note 57, at 633, 644 (concluding that decisions such as Smith v. Van Gorkom "clarify and explain the current standards of conduct for directors"); Mones, supra note 55, at 567 ("The Trans Union decision did not break new ground or introduce radical theories. Rather it followed the basic standards for the application of the business judgment rule established in Aronson v. Lewis . . . ."); Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 57, at 430 (disagreeing with the suggestion that Smith v. Van Gorkom represents "new law" and finding instead that it "plainly follows long-existing principles of, and cases concerning, corporate governance"); Wagner, supra note 55, at 124 (" [T] he Trans Union Case remains a coherent explication of a long-existing, fundamental safeguard for corporate management. It is neither a departure from previous Business Judgment Rule holdings nor a harbinger of judicial activism in the corporate sphere."). 136 Honabach, supra note 11, at 312 (stating that "section 102(b)(7) proved popular with corporate management" and that this was not surprising); Griffith, supra note 52, at 63 (claiming that "[w]ith the adoption of § 102(b)(7) . . . the management lobby won an amendment effectively overturning the decision" of Smith v. Van Gorkom); Lee, supra note 31, at 244 (arguing that "the Delaware-type legislation is an inappropriate response . . . that may have deleterious effects on corporate governance"). 137 Quillen, supra note 56, at 466 (stating that Smith v. Van Gorkom has "little lasting legal significance" and is "primarily a fact case"); Wander & LeCoque, supra note 56, at 39 ("[I]n light of the court"s portrayal of the facts, the decision appears to be correct and its outcome note surprising.").
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commentator even identified two beneficial results from Van Gorkom the increased use of experts by corporate boards and an improved deliberative process for important decision-making.
138
Most commentators argue that corporate managers exhibited traditional interest group behavior by turning to a favorable venue, the Delaware legislature, for relief when confronted with what they considered an expansion of their recognized sphere of liability. 139 The Delaware legislature provided that relief at the expense of shareholders.
140
To the extent this picture is accurate, 141 using the Delaware legislature in this manner would exemplify the "race to the bottom" theory of state corporate law. 142 This theory suggests that each state competes for incorporations by pandering to corporate managers and the state that provides the most incentives for managers to desire incorporation in its jurisdiction will be rewarded with a greater proportion of incorporations and their corresponding revenue. 143 To the extent that 138 Elson & Thompson, supra note 9, at 584 (tracing two specific alterations in corporate practice to Smith v. Van Gorkom: "1) the widespread use of third party advisers to give expert opinions to the board for various corporate transactions, and 2) the rise of elaborate decision-making procedures . . . ."). 139 Griffith, supra note 52, at 63 (noting that management was able to successfully lobby the legislature to enact section 102(b)(7)); Honabach, supra note 11 (espousing the theory that "the passage of the exculpatory provisions [was] nothing more than another instance in which corporate managers . . . were able to call successfully on state legislators to gain further insulation from shareholder control"). 142 See Weiss, supra note 140, at 638-639 (noting that under the "race to the bottom" theory, revenues are enhanced at the expense of shareholder rights). 143 Weiss, supra note 140, at 639 (arguing "that Delaware . . . has enjoyed success in the business of incorporations because of its "enabling" corporate code and the desire of its judiciary to promote the interests of corporate management at the expense of shareholder protection").
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the enactment of section 102(b)(7) was a product of a race to the bottom, its validity and usefulness would be called into question.
Was the Insurance Market in Crisis?
Another question raised regarding the initial enactment of section 102(b)(7) relates to its role as a response to the perceived directors" and officers" insurance crisis. As mentioned, there were three distinct but related problems in the directors" and officers" insurance market after Van Gorkom: (1) premiums were being increased, (2) the scope of coverage was being narrowed, and (3) some corporations were unable to secure coverage at any price. 144 The questions remain: why were these things happening and was a legislative response necessary or appropriate?
The dominant thesis on this point is that Van Gorkom itself caused the crisis because of the dramatic shift it signaled in the law of fiduciary duties for directors.
145
This section provides an alternative explanation; the insurance industry took advantage of the uncertainty surrounding the Van Gorkom decision to retain above average premiums for itself. The Bradley and Schipani study supports this decision; it found that, although premiums increased in an unprecedented manner, the market value of insurance carriers increased as well. 146 Bradley and Schipani interpret this confluence as proof that the premium increases were greater than necessary to offset the added risk created by Van Gorkom. 147 Thus, although Van Gorkom created some uncertainty and additional risk of liability for directors, the increase in premiums cannot be fully explained as a response to that uncertainty and risk. In fact, the evidence does not show a statistically significant decrease in the value of Delaware corporations after the Van Gorkom decision, a finding that would indicate perceived 126 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 9
harm to shareholders as a result of the holding. 148 Instead, the decrease in value coincides with the passage of section 102(b)(7), indicating that the most harmful event in this sequence was the removal of the liability sanction for director misconduct. 
Resolving the Uncertainty Created by Smith v. Van Gorkom
Even if the desire for increased revenues by the insurance industry can partially explain the perceived insurance crisis, at least part of the uncertainty and premium increases ought to be fairly laid at the feet of the Van Gorkom decision itself. There was widespread belief before the decision that it was nearly impossible to incur personal liability without a conflict of interest. 150 Because that impossibility became a reality, a range of unanswered questions confronted onlookers. The only certainty was that the predictability of Delaware law had taken a significant hit.
151
This section both recognizes those initial questions and argues that the evolution of Delaware common law has answered many of the questions raised by Van Gorkom in a manner that does not raise serious concerns about instability or additional director liability. The incremental approach adopted by Delaware courts in the wake of Van Gorkom is another reason why allowing for the elimination of personal liability by statute seems excessive today.
Van Gorkom replaced predictability with a series of important questions regarding the future of Delaware corporate law. 152 Immediately after the decision, Professors Burgman & Cox contemplated the impact Van Gorkom would have on:
the extent to which directors may rely on information and reports generated by insiders; the extent to which it is necessary or advisable 148 Id. (finding that Smith v. Van Gorkom "had little to no effect on the value of firms incorporated in Delaware[,]" but the "enactment of section 102(b)(7) is associated with a significant decrease in the equity values of Delaware firms"). 149 Id. (stating that "after the enactment of section 102(b)(7), premiums began to fall and the growth in the market value of the equities of these insurers subsided"). 150 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 151 Herzel & Katz, supra note 50, at 1190 (opining that "[o]ne important effect of Smith v. Van Gorkom is likely to be much greater randomness and unpredictability on the part of future courts passing on future board decisions").
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153
Even three years after Van Gorkom, Professors Macey and Miller struggled with the long-term implications of the decision.
154
At every turn, subsequent Delaware court decisions minimized the concerns initially raised with Van Gorkom. Almost immediately following Van Gorkom, the decision in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.
155 indicated that Delaware courts were not making as striking a departure from precedent or prior judicial philosophy as some had feared.
156 Shortly thereafter, the Hanson II 157 opinion reinforced the view that Van Gorkom was strictly a process decision and not an invitation for courts to gut the business judgment rule and regularly scrutinize the substance of board actions.
158 A full decade after Van Gorkom, one of the many opinions to arise from the Technicolor litigation 159 lent even further support to the proposition that Van
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Gorkom was an application of uncontroversial and straightforward principles of Delaware law to an unusual and unique set of facts.
160
Subsequent events have also diminished fears regarding the other impacts of Van Gorkom. The anticipated wave of decisions imposing liability on boards never occurred. A detailed study by Professors Black, Cheffins, and Klausner found only thirteen instances in which outside directors made personal payments to resolve litigation since 1980, including Van Gorkom itself. 161 Van Gorkom was the only case identified in the sample in which directors made a personal payment after a trial, the other twelve involved pre-trial settlements. 162 Van Gorkom is also the only case of oversight failure in which the company remained solvent. 163 These findings underscore the rarity of imposing personal liability on directors, and, even within these rare cases, the unusual posture of Van Gorkom.
164
Part of this absence of director liability may be attributable to the exculpatory statute itself. 165 However, the statute did not become effective until July 1, 1986, 166 and there is no case imposing Id. "However, a significant minority of commentators asserted that Van Gorkom did not mark a departure from existing law and its application would essentially be limited to its facts." Id. Bacon concludes that the "a careful reading of Technicolor III suggests that the latter view has prevailed." Id.
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167
C. Courts Are Replacing Due Care with Good Faith
Another problem with the current situation involving exculpatory statutes is that courts do not want to respect the shareholders" decision to eliminate liability. In the wake of the bursting of the dot-com bubble, a number of corporate scandals have occurred at places such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications, and many others. 168 When confronted with these recent breaches of the duty of care, courts have not simply dismissed cases. Instead, Delaware courts introduced a new prominence of the duty of good faith to confront the same problems that were traditionally handled by the duty of care.
169
This trend ignores the purported will of shareholders and causes uncertainty in Delaware law. Because these claims are factually similar to prior duty of care cases, courts are ignoring the will of shareholders and relying solely on the duty of good faith when companies have exculpatory provisions in their charters that waive personal liability for duty of care breaches. This trend causes uncertainty in two ways. First, the substance of the 167 In an interesting study, Helen Bowers also demonstrates that a less worrisome, but very commonly predicted, negative reaction to Van Gorkom never came to pass-the expectation that every board was going to feel the need to secure a fairness opinion after the decision. Helen M. Bowers duty of good faith is unsettled. Second, the scope of the effectiveness of the waiver of liability for a breach of the duty of care is uncertain because of the indeterminate overlap between the duty of care and the duty of good faith.
This section evaluates the phenomenon of replacing due care claims with good faith claims, investigates the lack of use or definition of the concept of good faith, and reviews some attempts by courts and theorists to construct a workable definition. This section concludes that courts and shareholders would be better served by a clear distinction between due care and good faith claims and the questionable enforceability of the protections of section 102(b) (7) is another element against the status quo.
The New Prominence of Good Faith
The Van Gorkom decision was rendered during a time of turmoil in the corporate world. Hostile takeovers had recently presented a challenge to incumbent boards, and both corporations and the judiciary were dealing with issues that raised novel questions of law. Those societal forces provided a backdrop for the Van Gorkom case, and commentators suggested that the possibly novel imposition of liability for breach of the duty of care was a judicial reaction to these pressures. 172 The market for directors" and officers" liability insurance is once again in turmoil. 173 In the private sector, numerous investor suits have been filed as increasingly active institutional investors seek to hold directors liable. 174 Sean Griffith puts forward an intriguing theory on the recent use of good faith by arguing that Delaware courts use good faith as a rhetorical device, in a manner similar to due care in Van Gorkom, to designate conduct as culpable, even when the substantive standards do not impose liability. 183 In recent good faith jurisprudence, Griffith identified some elements of duty of care cases and other elements of duty of loyalty cases, but no situation where either a duty of care or loyalty case was fully proven on its own. 184 Griffith further argued that courts blend these two causes of action to assign blame in a situation where traditional doctrinal elements are missing for the implied purpose of increasing accountability at the expense of board authority. A CALL FOR THE RE-ASSESSMENT OF 133  STATUTES THAT ALLOW FOR THE ELIMINATION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS to distinguish a lack of the duty of care from acts not taken in good faith. 187 In an early commentary on the statute, Professor Melvin Eisenberg noted that the meaning of good faith had not been judicially interpreted.
188 A good deal of that uncertainty persists today. There are no definitive statutory or judicial definitions. 189 Often, courts aver to the existence of good faith without providing any content as to its meaning.
190
In general, courts agree that some decisions are just so unsound, whether substantively or procedurally, that the good faith of the decision-makers is called into question.
191
The scope of good faith is turning into a critical issue, and several courts and commentators have recently grappled with it, 192 most prominently in the case of Brehm v. Eisner, 193 a case that is commonly referred to as Disney. Prior to Disney, courts identified possible breaches of the duty of good faith when a decision was "so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment" that it was otherwise inexplicable, 194 187 Balotti & Gentile, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that "it is unclear whether section 102(b)(7) would protect a director against liability for reckless acts" because, "to the extent recklessness involves conscious disregard of a known risk, such conduct is not taken in good faith and thus would not be a liability subject to limitation or elimination under section 102(b)(7)"); David S. Schaffer, Jr., Note, However, one major difference between the two scenarios is that Disney"s charter contained an exculpatory clause eliminating personal liability for duty of care breaches. 201 Because of this critical distinction, the Disney shareholders could not succeed in an action for a breach of the duty of care and were forced to rely on the duty of good faith. 202 In fact, the original Disney complaint was dismissed because it alleged primarily duty of care claims, and only upon being allowed to re-plead did the shareholders focus on the duty of good faith. 203 Although the Disney Court did not find wrongdoing by the directors, it did note that a deliberate failure to act in the face of a duty to do so was sufficient evidence to constitute a breach of the duty of good faith. 204 In one sense, Disney is simply a continuation of the unclear delineation of Delaware"s doctrine of good faith. In another sense, the decision harms Delaware law in two ways. First, it is an unprecedented application of the doctrine of good faith, so any observer or corporate official trying to adhere to his good faith 201 202 Baker, supra note 178, at 262 (arguing "that a fair reading of the Disney case essentially aligns the duty of good faith with the traditional duty of care, which would greatly diminish, if not render meaningless, the use of such exculpatory provisions"); Griffith, supra note 52, at 22-23 (finding that the allegations in Disney "would typically form the basis of a complaint under the duty of care, but the court did not pursue the analysis, perhaps because the business judgment rule and 102(b)(7) provision would have kept it from getting very far"); Janssen, supra note 169, at 1596 (stating that because the exculpation clause prevented an action for breach of the duty of care, "the Disney stockholders needed to plead that the directors breached another fiduciary duty" which they did in "a possible good faith breach"). 203 Rivers, supra note 169, at 646 (finding that the "amended [Disney] complaint alleg[ed] that the directors should be held personally liable for a knowing or intentional lack of due care in their decision-making process" and the court held that this complaint sufficiently alleged that the ""directors failed to exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to Disney and its stockholders""); Veasey & DiGuglielmo, supra note 16, at 1440-41 (noting that Disney was initially a due care case that was repleaded and "morphed into a "good faith" case" One fundamental assertion of contractarians, and one that is contested by more traditional corporate law scholars, is that all terms of the corporate "contract" are subject to negotiation and pricing, including the imposition of fiduciary duties. 221 This concept is central because traditional scholars view fiduciary duties as being imposed for the benefit of all investors, sophisticated and naïve, current and future, and believe that one group is incapable of waiving those duties for all shareholders. 222 Contractarians, in contrast, do not see a principled distinction between the ability to waive fiduciary duties and, for example, the ability to demand a preferred dividend. 223 Each choice has a value to shareholders, and current and prospective parties to the "contract" can assess the value of those provisions along with the rest of the package.
Contractarianism's Claim to Fairness
In simple terms, the contractarian"s response to assertions of fairness is that investors get what they pay for; any dissatisfying terms are offset by a lower price. 224 Contractarians do not assert that every economic factor, governance nuance, jurisdictional advantage or disadvantage, or any other item impacting value is expressly considered, weighed, and assigned a value by every investor. Rather, contractarians rely on the efficiency of the capital markets to incorporate these price terms for investors. 225 Under this theory, markets are informationally efficient, rapidly incorporate publicly available information into the market price of securities, and incorporate the information in the correct way.
226
Under this conception, "correct" does not necessarily mean it is ultimately accurate; it only needs to accurately reflect the aggregate sentiment concerning the news at the time it is announced. 227 For example, if a corporation hires a new Chief Executive Officer and the consensus is that he will perform admirably, the stock price should rise if the relevant market is informationally efficient. It does not matter whether the world will learn in two years that the Chief Executive Officer"s plans were ill-conceived or that he paid insufficient attention to critical details. That information will be incorporated into the market over time as perceptions change.
Contractarianism also makes a more complex and powerful assertion regarding the fairness of the price paid by investors. Based on tenets of the modern portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing theory, contractarians believe that most investors will eliminate firm-specific risks through their investment strategy, even if shares are not properly priced ex ante. 228 Portfolio theory contends that investors can minimize risks by purchasing shares of firms that react differently to certain fundamental stimuli, in other words, by diversifying their portfolios. 229 Further, the type of risk that investors are taking under contractarian theory the risk that the prospect of a later harm has not been properly priced into a security today is the type of firm-specific risk that investors can avoid through diversification. 230 Therefore, contractarians assert that their theory is fair, even if it allows for the waiver of shareholder protections such as fiduciary duties because (1) risks are priced 226 See source cited supra at 221; see also William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 ACCT. REV. 23, 35 (1981) available at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4826%28198101%2956%3A1%3C23%3AME%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q (discussing the theories of market efficiency and stating that "the securities market is said to efficient with respect to some specific information if prices act as if everyone knows the information"). 227 Beaver, supra note 226, at 32. 228 Cox, supra note 225, at 53 ( "Modern portfolio theory and capital asset pricing theory suggest that investment in an efficiently diversified portfolio, such as an index fund, will virtually eliminate unsystematic risk."). 229 Id. at 54-55 (stating that "it is possible to eliminate unsystematic risk through efficient diversification" and that "[a]n investor who fails to diversify therefore may be subject to uncompensated, unsystematic risk"); see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 209, at 116-19. 230 Id. at 55, 56 (recognizing that there is a "risk of an incident of ex post harm to an investor [that] may not be reflected in the ex ante price" but stating that "[d]iversification of risk obviates this . . . by rendering the risk of detrimental firm-specific ex post events irrelevant to an efficiently diversified investor"). informationally efficient market. The elements of the corporate charter, including the exculpatory provision, should be a known aspect of the corporate contract that is priced ex ante into the investment.
B. Limits of the Contractarian Theory
In general, the contractarian theory appears sound. It is possible that the only problem is that courts, because of their own conceptions of fairness, are unwilling to enforce this limitation that shareholders have voluntarily placed on themselves. The problems cited in Part II can be solved or addressed by stating: (1) that shareholders paid less for the risk of providing poor incentives for board members, (2) the fact that the statute might be unnecessary is offset by its voluntary nature, and (3) the confusion and unpredictability is the fault of courts who do not apply section 102(b)(7) in the face of what they consider punishable conduct by a corporate board. It is possible that the fault for section 102(b)(7)"s problems lies elsewhere, but that should not be accepted without further examination.
There is also evidence that the contractarian theory, at least in the context of exculpatory provisions, is not as robust an explanation of how corporations actually function as it purports to be. The economic theory underlying contractarianism dictates that strong fiduciary obligations are only desirable to the extent that the cost of enforcement does not exceed the expected benefit. 234 Thus, the economic theory predicts that firms with a strong form of fiduciary obligation would be priced lower than an otherwise equal firm with a lesser burden on directors. 235 However, evidence regarding the prices of Delaware firms surrounding the time of the enactment of section 102(b)(7) shows just the opposite effect. 236 Instead of decreasing after the Van Gorkom decision when many commentators noted that fiduciary obligations were stronger than previously anticipated, 237 values remained constant. 238 telling is that equity values declined upon the enactment of section 102(b)(7) when the theory predicted they would increase. 239 These inconsistencies question the validity of the underlying economic assumptions that provide contractarianism with its assertion of fairness. Without a clear claim to fairness, the persuasive power of the theory is diminished.
Another discrepancy exists between the theory"s predictions and actual corporate behavior. Because the exculpatory provision is permissive, one would expect to see a wide variety of charter provisions tailored to the specific needs of corporations. Instead, a recent study by Michael Klausner demonstrates that firms usually either include a provision that eliminates liability to the maximum extent permitted by the statute or omit such a provision altogether. 240 This discrepancy exists both for existing firms that adopted a charter provision upon enactment of a statute and IPO firms that include such a provision prior to their initial offering of securities. 241 Although it is possible that Delaware happened to strike the perfect balance in its statute causing essentially all firms to adopt uniform provisions, it is more likely that some imperfection is driving these limited choices.
242
There are at least two explanations as to the source of these imperfections. The first explanation, provided by Klausner, is that learning externalities prohibit shareholders from making optimal choices in deciding to adopt a charter amendment and in finding innovative types of charter amendments to adopt.
243
The second [VOL. 9 evaluate the options, lobby others to aid in the passage or failure of the particular proposition, and participate in the voting process would exceed the value many shareholders except to receive in return. 250 If rational apathy is the norm, requiring a periodic vote on provisions that eliminate director liability would have little, if any, impact. There is a danger that this formalistic re-approval would not produce any benefits, but would instead waste corporate time and resources.
Periodic re-approval of exculpatory provisions should produce substantive results and should not fall into the trap of empty formalism, for at least two reasons. First, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an influential group that advises money managers, mutual funds, and other large shareholders on proxy voting matters, recommends voting against a proposal to eliminate personal liability for directors. 251 This influential recommendation should mean that such a proposal will be highly contested, and corporate managers will need to persuade shareholders to continue to provide this additional protection. Second, even if most corporations reapprove charter amendments, the discussion provoked will be useful. Discussions between management and shareholders often include negotiation and compromise. The opening of this dialogue may provoke the sort of tailored provisions that may limit rather than fully eliminate the liability that the Klausner paper identified as missing from the current landscape.
B. Use Existing Shareholder Proposal System
A second possible solution is to use the current shareholder proposal system to adopt or repeal exculpatory provisions. Shareholders already have the capacity to place matters on the ballot at the annual meeting under the proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 252 Assuming that all of the procedural guidelines are met, shareholders at a particular company could hold a periodic referendum on the wisdom of its exculpatory charter provision and accomplish something similar to what was proposed above for the legislature to do by statute. 
